Finding hidden risks, Charting a safe course
|
NEW TRENDS IN AVIATION SECURITY by Larry C. Johnson (Fall 1995) Your early morning flight from Los Angeles International Airport to Washington, D.C. has leveled off at 37,000 feet. As the plane crosses the Rocky Mountains flight attendants scurry up and down the aisles serving breakfast. You settle back into your seat to watch the movie but without warning your senses are overwhelmed by a deafening bang and fiery cloud. You barely have time to utter an epithet or scream before you find yourself hurtling through the air, surrounded by passengers and debris from the disintegrating aircraft. Deprived of oxygen and suffering from shock, you black out as your body accelerates toward the earth. You, along with 299 other passengers and crew, have died because of a terrorist bomb hidden in luggage stowed in the jet’s belly. Fortunately, most air travelers will never know the horror of being sucked out of an airplane following an in flight explosion. Yet this scenario is more than an idle fantasy conjured by a fertile imagination. Since 1985 more than 1000 passengers and crew have died because terrorists penetrated security and smuggled a bomb on board a civilian airliner. Airplanes of carriers such as Pan Am, TWA, UTA, and Avianca have been bombed by terrorists, with devastating consequences. Aviation bombings are rare, but they represent a serious threat that the aviation community is not yet prepared to counter effectively and consistently, especially within the continental United States. While security measures are in place to reduce vulnerabilities to this threat, we are still years away from deploying explosive detection systems that are reliable, efficient, and cheap. Meanwhile, the Federal Aviation Administration is moving proactively to beef up domestic security and eliminate the gap between international and domestic procedures. This has sparked an outcry from airline executives and airport operators, who have legitimate concerns that they will be unable to bear the financial cost—estimated at over $2 billion dollars–of implementing the newly mandated procedures. This article examines where the U.S. aviation security system is headed and the threat facing civil aviation. We also analyze the implications of tougher domestic security measures for airline and airport executives as well as the traveling public. In our judgment, these developments have unleashed a highly contentious process that will ultimately require both the Federal Government and the airline industry to reassess how aviation security should be organized, implemented, and funded. The Aviation Security System Security for airline passengers currently is handled in two arenas—one international and one national. Internationally security standards set by the International Civil Aviation Organization’s (ICAO) Annex 17, offers a least common denominator approach to security. While accepted internationally, these standards fall short of providing a tough set of measures that protect air carriers that have been targeted by terrorists. For countries like the United States, however, Annex 17 is a starting point for security rather than the final destination. The real action on security occurs at the national level. By law and by tradition, a nation has the right to set and enforce aviation security practices for their flag carriers, regardless of where they operate, and for foreign carriers that depart from its airports. In actual operation, however, these rights are not exercised equally. The United States, in particular, has been very aggressive in setting the standards and practices used for aviation security. Its influence is partly due to its market influence—a large number of passengers fly on U.S. flagged carriers and a large number of foreign carriers want to fly to the United States. Two U.S. laws—the Foreign Airport Security Act of 1986 and more recently the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990—provide the legal foundation guiding how the U.S. carries out the aviation security mission, particularly overseas. Both laws recognize the principle that a country—in this case the United States—has the sovereign right to control who lands planes in its territory. The United States can set standards for any carrier that wants to land in the United States, although foreign carriers are not required to use the same security programs followed by U.S. flagged carriers. The legal framework also requires the U.S. Government to assess security at any foreign airport where U.S. carriers operate. In addition, the FAA monitors the overseas performance of security procedures such as adding personnel to screen passengers prior to allowing them on board a plane or requiring passengers to be screened with metal detectors before boarding a plane. If the world consisted of only one nation the task of aviation security would be simple and straightforward. In the multinational world, however, aviation security involves more confusion and conflict than clarity. A U.S. carrier operating in the Germany, for instance, must carry out extraordinary procedures mandated by the FAA . Yet, the U.S. air carriers operations at Frankfurt’s international airport are controlled primarily by Germany’s federal government, and the Hessian State Government in particular. While the FAA can dictate the procedures U.S. flagged carriers U.S. must follow and fine them for lapses in security, its ability to monitor those procedures falls under the jurisdiction and laws of Germany. In addition, foreign flagged carriers flying to the United States claim that under Annex 17 the United States cannot compel them to impose tighter security procedures. The FAA can only require foreign carriers to implement higher standards if they are departing from a U.S. airport. For many years the demands of operating in an international environment have generated friction between the FAA and U.S. air carriers. Prior to the bombing of Pan Am 103 U.S. air carriers complained regularly that they were being held accountable by the U.S. Government for implementing security procedures, but were on their own in securing the permission of the host government. In the aftermath of Pan Am 103 the U.S. Government expanded its role in helping U.S. based air carriers resolve disputes with foreign authorities over implementing security procedures. For instance, U.S. air carriers operating in Great Britain and Germany in the Spring of 1992 were co-located at check-in counters with Iran Air. Because of Iran’s dubious status as a state sponsor of terrorism the carriers expressed fears that the Iranian airline officials, by virtue of their proximity, would gain knowledge about U.S. mandated security procedures. Agreeing that the carriers had a legitimate concern the U.S. State Department, working with the FAA, interceded with British and German officials to provide a solution. The FAA is doing a good job of protecting U.S. airline passengers, but its ability to do its job is hampered by its second class status within the Government bureaucracy and internal conflicts resulting from carrying out its other regulatory missions—e.g., flight safety and airport operations. At the White House and the National Security Council, for example, transportation security issues in general, and aviation in particular, are handled on an ad hoc basis. This has been the case for both Democratic and Republican administrations. Accordingly the FAA must use a rather convoluted bureaucratic chain of command to raise serious security issues to the President. If the FAA’s Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation Security decides punitive action is required against a country for inadequate security, such as suspending flights, he would first inform the FAA Administrator who in turn would present the issue to the Secretary of Transportation. It is the responsibility of the Secretary of Transportation to present the issue to the White House. The FAA’s regulatory missions also cloud its security mission. Witness the recent effort, for example, to raise security standards at airports around the country. This has touched off an intensive behind the scenes lobbying campaign by representatives of the air carriers and airport operators who believe the FAA is going too far. Many on the commercial side of the aviation industry argue that the new measures threaten the economic viability of the industry and that in the absence of a specific, credible threat, the additional procedures are not being implemented in accordance with the criteria specified in established contingency plans. Along with industry complaints some members of Congress have weighed in on the debate, questioning the basis for the recommendations of the FAA security experts. Assessing the Threat Unfortunately, the wrong question is being asked. We should be less concerned about whether or not security officials are accurately evaluating new threat information and focus instead on whether it is even appropriate to base an aviation security system on our ability to get accurate, predictive intelligence. Traditionally an increased threat has been the impetus for installing new security procedures. This approach, in our opinion, is dangerous. Despite conventional wisdom, intelligence agencies rarely get information that permits a policymaker or security official to take preventative action or predict what a terrorist will do. It is worth noting that the vast majority of terrorist attacks against aviation—most notably the bombings of Pan Am 103 and UTA 772—have occurred without advance warning. Accurately predicting the weather in Oklahoma next year is far easier than accurately predicting if there will be a terrorist attack in Oklahoma City. The inadequacy of intelligence as a foundation for determining the appropriate security levels in the United States has become more difficult, in our judgment, because the groups now responsible for most terrorist activity around the world are not easily penetrated by traditional intelligence methods. With the end of the cold war the threat has shifted away from national liberation movements to groups affiliated with extremist religious organizations. We need only recall the bombing of the World Trade Center, the nerve gas attacks in the Tokyo subway, the bus bombings in Israel, and the airplane hijacking in Algeria to realize that the culprits are drawn from radical religious sects rather than the more familiar cold war groups, such as the Red Army Faction and the Red Brigade. Moreover, going after these groups poses some rather daunting civil rights and legal issues. Is the United States prepared to authorize the FBI or the CIA carte blanche to spy on religious organizations? In the wake of Ruby Ridge and Waco this appears to be an unlikely option. Yet as we near the dawn of the 21st Century we are likely to see more, not fewer, radical groups who believe that they are agents of some deity to bring to pass a divine judgment or retribution on a wicked world. Complicating matters is the question of access. Penetrating a national liberation guerrilla movement is difficult. But gaining entree to the inner circle of a radical religious group is a problem of a different magnitude. While not an impossible mission it is, in our judgment, not feasible given the current methods of the intelligence community. This is an issue that neither the intelligence nor law enforcement community are prepared to confront. Instead of waiting for a spy to discover a terrorist plot and pass this information on to the appropriate authorities, the aviation security system should be designed to prevent acts and deter threats. Failure to implement such a system can have disastrous results. The December 1994 hijacking of an Air France flight from Algeria is a case in point. Anyone who has monitored the front page of a major newspaper during 1994 would recall that Algeria has been wracked for several years by a wave of terrible terrorist violence. Much of this violence has been carried out by radical Islamic groups bent on ousting a secular government. Notwithstanding the violence, the French adopted the traditional approach to aviation security by relying on Algerian authorities to maintain the appropriate level of security. This approach left 170 passengers and crew vulnerable to the events that ensued on December 24. Four hijackers affiliated with the Armed Islamic Group, disguised as airport security officials, took over the Air France crew. After killing three passengers, including a French citizen, the hijackers were allowed to take off and subsequently land in Marseilles, France on December 26. As the situation continued to deteriorate French commandos stormed the plane, rescued the passengers and crew, and killed the hijackers. The world was aghast when it learned the hijackers had placed explosives on board the plane, intended to blow it up in the air above Paris. Only in the aftermath of the hijacking and narrowly averted aerial kamikaze assault on Paris did French security officials tighten security on flights between Algeria and France and assert their right to monitor Algerian and the airline compliance. The world can no longer run the risk, as did France in Algeria, of a security system hastily put together in reaction to specific incidents. During the late 1960’s and early 1970’s a surge aircraft hijackings within the United States prompted the introduction of walk through metal detectors at U.S. airports. Requiring preboard security screening led subsequently to a dramatic reduction of domestic hijackings by individuals who had smuggled guns on board aircraft. We did not see a similar decline in international hijackings, at least initially, because neither the United States nor the airlines could unilaterally force other countries to adopt these security measures. In the wake of the 1986 hijacking of Pan Am 73, which resulted in the deaths of 22 people and injuries to more than 125, the FAA tightened security screening procedures for U.S. air carriers operating internationally. Since 1986 no U.S. air carriers have been hijacked because a terrorist defeated the preboard passenger screening process. Coping With Today’s Threat Today we have a sound security system for defeating hijackings that is rooted in technology—walk through metal detectors and x-ray—and relies on human operators. Although a number of systems are coming on the market that try to automate this procedure or improve the ability of the security personnel to locate a weapon in carry on baggage, the decisions of human beings still play a large role in ensuring that weapons are not carried on board an airplane. Turning to explosives detection the comfort level for detecting explosives, even with knowledgeable security personnel, evaporates. Unlike the systems to prevent hijackings, there is no comparable technology presently available for detecting explosives that meets three key criteria—it is reasonably priced, reliable, and efficient. Instead of solving the problem with technology the airline industry is forced to rely on assumptions about human behavior. Namely, that most people do not have a death wish and will not wittingly carry a bomb on board a plane. When the Federal Aviation Administration ordered airports and airlines in the United States to implement new security measures in August of this year they were acting preventatively. This is another sign of the improvements the FAA has made in security operations since Pan Am 103. Instead of reacting to a specific threat the FAA is taking into account a variety of events. Top on the list was the fear of retaliation from radical Islamic groups if a guilty verdict was delivered in the conspiracy case against Egyptian cleric Sheik Rahman. Another concern was the threat the radical Palestinian group Hamas issued, warning it would attack the United States if one of its leaders was extradited from the U.S. to Israel. In addition, the FAA believes the World Trade Center in New York City and the Federal building in Oklahoma City have dispelled the notion that the U.S. is domestically immune to the threat of terrorism. Accordingly, they have decided that the United States can no longer have one level of security for international flights and another, lower level of security, domestic operations. The implications of this decision are enormous and will impose substantial economic costs on the air carriers and the airports, which will pass the costs on to the traveling public. But, in our professional judgment, the FAA’s action is warranted and appropriate for the times. The major consequence of the FAA decision will be seen in the area of positive passenger bag match (PPBM). Simply put, PPBM is coming to America. Positive passenger bag match ensures that no baggage will be carried on a plane unless the passenger that checked the bag is on that plane. This system has proved to be very effective in deterring and preventing aircraft bombings on international flights. It has not been used domestically, however, because air carriers say that they cannot implement the procedure and maintain the same level of service. Part of the problem is the enormous volume of domestic traffic and the short connecting time between flights in the hub and spoke system in use today. Keeping passengers and bags together already is a difficult task. Most in the airline industry argue that PPBM on domestic flights will force a dramatic cutback in the number of flights and operational efficiency. Yet, industry insiders also concede that it a bomb explodes on board a domestic flight that opposition to PPBM will be moot. Moving to PPBM will be costly. According to sources in both the FAA and the aviation industry, a recent study puts the first year cost of implementing PPBM at between two and three billion dollars. While this is a lot of money it works out to roughly two dollars per passenger per flight. Implementing PPBM would probably remove as many as three banks of flights per day from the current ten bank system. This will create inconveniences for passengers and could bankrupt several of the weaker carriers, according to industry officials. Not taking action, however, could also prove costly. Conservative estimates of the bombing of Pan Am 103 put expenses at close to two billion dollars. The loss of Pan Am 103 was a fatal blow to the carrier’s viability as a commercial entity. This financial loss does not include the emotional suffering of those who lost loved ones. Next Steps to a Secure Future We are entering a new era of aviation security that will change how airlines and airports do business and how you travel. While the adjustments may not be easy, particularly in the beginning, we believe the results will make traveling by air more safe in the long run. The choice before the United States Government is whether or not it wants to strengthen its ability to prevent terrorist acts against civil aviation. Because U.S. aviation is a high profile target of terrorist threats, and since commercial aviation plays an important role in supporting national defense, the federal government should treat aviation security as part of a national defense strategy. U.S. flagged carriers are targeted by terrorists because they have the U.S. flag on their tails. They are surrogate targets. And U.S. commercial air carriers play a key role in U.S. military operations, assisting in the transport of troops or material during national crises. It is, therefore, reasonable for the federal government to view protecting commercial aviation as a national security issue. Instituting this reform would require significant changes at the Federal level. One approach would be moving the security function currently performed by the FAA to the Department of Defense. The responsibility for protecting commercial airlines should be handled by an Assistant Secretary for Transportation Security. This job would have both international and domestic responsibilities. In addition, the Federal Government should take on the job of security at airports rather than leaving it up to local governments or the private sector. Many foreign governments successfully carry out aviation security functions themselves rather than relying on private industry, and the United States should do the same. The second step towards better security is eliminating the dichotomy between international and domestic security procedures. The FAA deserves accolades for moving in this direction. Unwilling to wait for terrorists to bomb a domestic airliner, the FAA is pursuing a course of preventative action by requiring airports and air carriers operating within the United States to use security procedures comparable to those in place for international flights. At the same time, the FAA is going to need the muscle of the White House and the Secretary of State to insist that other countries who fly to the United States use the same kind of security program that U.S. carriers are required to use. This issue—known colloquially as the level playing field within the aviation industry—is very controversial. The controversy pits U.S. air carriers against the principle of national sovereignty. The carriers argue, correctly in our view, that because they must bear the cost of security requirements levied by the Federal Government they are put at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis foreign carriers, who do not have to adopt the same practices. Yet the FAA alone does not have the political clout to insist that all countries coming to the United States must follow the same procedures. If it tried to enforce this requirement the FAA would find itself in the middle of a huge foreign policy wrangle. In fact, several countries have warned that they will prohibit the FAA from inspecting their airports if such a law is passed. Without access to these airports the FAA will be unable to certify whether or not adequate security procedures are in place to protect U.S. passengers. This brings us back to the relevance of treating aviation security as a national security priority. Eliminating the gap in security practices and achieving greater uniformity in security standards requires stronger federal leadership, starting with the President and the Congress. Finally, a critical element in achieving better aviation security is technology. The mission for protecting airliners is very simple—do not let unauthorized people with weapons get on board planes and do not let bombs on board planes. While there is a technological solution for weapons—guns and knives—there is not a similar technological fix for explosives. The two best systems on the market for detecting explosives at airports are dogs and the CTX 5000. Mother Nature still has the edge in explosives detection, winning by a nose. A dog’s nose to be specific. While very effective, dogs are not feasible for handling daily responsibilities at a high volume airport such as Chicago’s O’Hare or Los Angeles International. The CTX 5000 is a third generation x-ray computed tomographic (CT) scanner. Similar to medical CAT scan technology, the CTX 5000 creates a cross section image of luggage and analyzes the image using sophisticated software, which automatically identifies explosives based on their known CT signatures. This is the only system currently certified by the FAA as an Explosive Detection System. One shortcoming of the CTX 5000 is its relatively slow processing speed for bags. Efficiency could be improved dramatically by using these units in combination with the airlines computer reservation systems to identify passengers whose luggage needs more scrutiny. The FAA is funding the development and testing of a computer reservations system that could be used in conjunction with other security technologies. Experts agree that presently there are no available technologies that can be installed in airports that are reasonably priced, efficient, and reliable. Achieving a technological solution to the threat of explosives is feasible but will require, in our view, a refocused effort. The current research program under the auspices of the FAA’s Technical Center is spending only $37 million annually to find a single technology that can meet the operational requirements of airlines and the security standards of the FAA. Finding this silver bullet has been an elusive prey and more difficult task than anyone imagined. A study commissioned earlier this year by Congressmen Benjamin Gilman and Lee Hamilton is being conducted by the General Accounting Office and may provide answers or recommendations on how to tackle this thorny issue. One resource that has been ignored in this technological quest is the national laboratory system. Labs such as Sandia, Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, and Pacific Northwest are staffed by scientists and engineers well suited to looking for answers to these types of questions. Unfortunately they have not yet been brought to bear on this issue. Conclusion We are moving into a new era of better aviation security. Because of hard lessons learned from previous terrorist and criminal attacks the government and industry are better prepared in the best position ever to confront the current threat. Yet the current system is flawed and additional changes are needed. As the number of commercial flights continue to expand, the number of passengers increase, and the next generation of aircraft are deployed, the vulnerability of the system to explosives will increase rather than diminish if new technology is not developed. During the waning years of the twentieth century, finding a solution to the threat of explosives will preoccupy government and airline security officials. It is an area, that in our judgment, requires far greater effort on the part of federal authorities.
Larry Johnson is President of Janus Security Associates, an international consulting firm in Arlington, VA. Before starting this company he was Deputy Director for Transportation Security in the Office of Counter Terrorism at the U.S. Department of State and worked previously for the Central Intelligence Agency. |